Ifthis was ever a question that could be asked and answered in the abstract, or with reference to some postulated ideal situation, it is not so now. I am raising and suggesting an answer to the question in the context of recent developments in education in Britain; but since those recent developments are by no means unique to Britain, the discussion may well be of broader relevance too.
The context, then, in which I am raising the question is one of increasing political control, at a national level, over both the curriculum of schools, and the form and content of teacher education itself. Several developments have combined, in Britain, which make it difficult to be optimistic about the future of any serious values education in schools; but at the same time, some opportunities have been opened up which could be grasped by teacher educators.
I shall set the context first in terms of the school curriculum itself; then in terms of developments in teacher education.
When the National Curriculum for England and Wales was first sketched out in 1987, one of the many negative reactions to it was the thought that it would involve little more than the transmission of a predetermined syllabus in each of a defined list of subjects; possibilities for pupils' own involvement in their learning, for their exploration of and critical reflection on matters concerning their own lives -for, indeed, the whole area which often goes under the label of Personal and Social Education -looked distinctly limited. Five years later, after many syllabus materials and guidelines have appeared, there has been no lack of reference to the need for pupils to engage with questions of values; on the other hand, there are indications that, at least in the view of government, there is no need to take these references too seriously.
There has been room for such discrepancies to arise because of the distinction between what is statutory and what exists merely in guidelines; Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 an~ because of the complexity in ,the way in whIch both statutory provisions and guidelines are arrived at. In some cases, syllabus proposals which gave some emphasis to questions of values (e.g. in the treatment of environmental questions as they arise both in geography and in science) have been watered down before reaching their final statutory form; in other cases there was never any intention that certain proposals should have statutory status. At the time of the Education Reform Act, 1988, a National Curriculum Council (NCC) was set up, with a remit to make recommendations concerning the whole curriculum. Part of the NCe's activity has been to recommend a set of cross-curricular themes, and to issue guidelines for them. More will be said about these themes below; but one thing which they are held to have in common is that they provide an opportunity for the exploration of values and beliefs. The provision of these cross-curricular themes within a school's curriculum, however, is not required by law.
The position at the time of writing, then, is that a pile of documents exists, within which quite frequent references are made to value issues; but how far the aspirations behind these references will be realised in schools is quite another question. It is also true that the aspiration that questions of values should enter into the school curriculum is often not made very specific. Statements such as the following, from Guidance documents on cross-curricular themes issued by the NCC, are typical: One measure of how seriously a commitment towards any form of values education is taken might be the extent to which teachers are to be trained to deal with questions of values in their teaching. Here again, so far as central initiatives are concerned there has been little more than a paper acknowledgement of the issues, and even that appears, at the time of writing, to be due for further dilution. For the past few years, a set of criteria for the accreditation of courses of teacher education (via CATE, the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education) has been in force. These criteria are rather like the requirements of the National Curriculum itself, in that the need for teachers to deal with questions of values is recognised, but is not given great weight or much specification. On completion of their course, the criteria state, students should be able to incorporate in their teaching crosscurricular dimensions (e.g. equal opportunities, multicultural education and personal and social education); and they should be able to teach controversial issues in a balanced way (DES Circular 24/89: Initial Teacher Training: Approval of Courses).
It was always the case that in trying to meet these aims in the preparation of teachers, institutions would be labouring under pressure of time and of many other competing aims. More recently it appears that attempts to prepare teachers to engage in any serious values education will be still more severely constrained. On both sides of the political spectrum there is agreement that a 8 higher proportion of teacher training than has been the case should be carried out in schools; for the present Conservative government, the Secretary of State for Education has announced (January 1992) that this proportion should be 80%. The primary intention is that teachers should be as well prepared as possible in the competences of classroom teaching, which is assumed to be in their subject specialism; an inevitable side-effect, whether intended or not, is that there will be less time available for any studies which are aimed at giving teachers either a more theoretical or even simply a broader basis for their work. Consistently with this, it is no surprise that new criteria for teacher training are to be produced which will say still less, if anything at all, about teacher's responsibilities and capacities in the area of values education. Perhaps one lesson that can be drawn from current trends is that, if there is to be a place in teacher education for an input from specialists who are not themselves classroom teachers, that role will not be primarily in equipping teachers with classroom competences. Politically the decision appears to have been made that this is the role of the schools. In the limited time available in any course of teacher education, a specialist input would do well to concentrate on something which otherwise would not provided at all. The current British context, then, in terms both curriculum and of teacher education, does encourage optimism about values education in schools. Yet this is in a wider context in which both politicians and members of the public often suggest that schools are partly ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,oi for what are seen as the moral ills society. Schools may be seen as doing too little for moral and civic development of their pupils; the 1988 Education Reform Act itself required the school curriculum must 'promote spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and ph development of pupils at the school and society'. It would see that a heavy burden is being placed on teachers, of a responsibility for the moral good of their pupils and the s which extends far beyond their competence as teachers of their subject; but that, on current trends, the education of teachers will include less and less preparation for this role.
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To repeat, what can teacher education do to prepare teachers to play at least some worthwhile part in values education? I shall suggest that, on certain conceptions of values education, there is in fact very little that can be done; but that there is another, and very important, aspect of values education which does offer more hope.
Much that has been written on values education, more specifically under the heading of 'moral education', has been concerned with the development of a range of dispositions and competences on the part of individuals. There have been approaches which see moral education primarily as the teaching of a certain form of reasoning (associated, for instance, with the name of John Wilson in Britain and with Lawrence Kohlberg in the USA, though Kohlberg hims~lf preferred to speak of 'cognitive stimulation' rather than teaching). The intention of such approaches has been to equip individuals to make their own moral judgements, in a way that is both autonomous and rational, without predetermining what judgements they would make. Such approaches have been criticised, and more recently the tide seems to be turning towards an approach which, often referring to Aristotle, emphasises that what most of all have to be developed are appropriate dispositions that are as much emotional as cognitive -in short, virtues.
Neither of these approaches seems at present to offer a realistic possibility for values education in schools of a form which teachers could be trained to deliver. The more 'rationalist' or 'cognitive' approach does, certainly, hold out the possibility of systematic programmes of education in moral reasoning being worked out, and if there were such a systematic programme, teachers could be trained to teach it.
But (leaving aside philosophical questions about the appropriateness of such an approach), the development of the National Curriculum has so much concentrated attention on the teaching of a (rather traditional) list of core subjects that the insertion of what would be virtually a new subject is not for the foreseeable future a realistic option. The problem with the 'development of virtues' approach is different: even supposing there were general agreement on the qualities to be developed, we have too little idea of how to go about promoting such development. Perhaps there is no systematic programme that could be developed; surely a lot must depend on home' environment and peer group relationships; and in so far as a child's moral development in this sense depends on teachers at all, it may be a matter of the example a teacher sets. The effect of example may not itself be predictable, but may depend on some little understood interaction between the Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 Australian Toumal of Tendzer Education characteristics of a particular teacher and particular child. Whether teachers can be trained, or even selected, to be moral exemplars is very doubtful; and if there were a form of initial teacher education that would have predictable success in turning out teachers of good moral character, it would surely have to be different from the current courses which concentrate almost wholly on instilling certain competences. In the present context, then, whatever can be done by way of preparing teachers to contribute to values education, will have to be done in a way that can be fitted in to the primary political concern of preparing teachers to deliver a set curriculum. But there is a possibility that builds on that primary concern.
Even if the development of moral qualities in individuals is something which the education system as presently constituted can hardly tackle in any deliberate way at all, there is another aspect of values education, which depends on recognising the extent to which values, especially in a complex and pluralist society, are both subject matter and ingredient of public debate. At present much public debate on matters of values hardly goes beyond the level of assertion and coun ter-assertion; ra tionally-demons tra ted positions, reasoned consensus, and understanding of the positions of others are all less in evidence than they might be. I think it will hardly be disputed (and is not out of line with the professed aims of the Education Reform Act) that to enable citizens of a democratic and pluralist society to engage in a reasoned way on debate about value issues which are of public importance could be a proper educational aim. And, fortunately, it is not unrealistic to think that teachers can be enabled to make a positive contribution in this area.
It will be helpful here to give some examples of the sorts of issue I have in mind. As it happens, within the context of recent curriculum developments in Britain, such issues come up often within the cross-curricular themes already mentioned. That is not to say that they come up only here; but anyone concerned with values education has pragmatic reason for building on what is already to hand. (A principle that could apply in other countries, though the illustration I go on to give is specific to recent British developments.) The cross-curricular themes are to hand and do have official recognition, even though not statutory force. It will be useful, then, to list some of the questions of values which are already recognised in this context, under the headings of the cross-curricular themes in which they come up.
Economic and Industrial Understanding
One topic recognised under these theme is the distribution of wealth. In a national, a European and a world context it will become clear to pupils that there are great disparities in the material conditions of life. This raises questions about justice, both within a society and between nations. Is a situation in which some people have more than others automatically unjust? What determines whether a situation is just or unjust?
Environmental Education
Many of the NC documents on particular subjects have anticipated the idea of environmental education as a cross-curricular theme; as one would expect, the documents on science, technology and geography are well aware of environmental issues.
Often, one finds a reference to environmental consequences and factors which have to be considered in addition to others, including ethical ones (for some reason the term 'ethical' is commoner than 'moral'). But this is misleading in its suggestion that environmental questions do not already contain questions of values. Here is one deep and central one: Are all of the moral questions about how we are to treat the environment questions about how other human beings, both now and in the future, will be affected? Or are the effects on non-human animals also morally relevant? And further, are effects on the non-sentient environment morally relevant in their own right? Can there be anything wrong in irreversibly altering the natural environment, when effects on sentient beings are put on one side?
Citizenship
Here it seems hardly necessary to demonstrate that moral issues are raised. Let me take just one or two examples involving the political activity of voting. Should citizens see voting or not voting as a matter simply of individual preference, or should they consider themselves to have a duty to vote (this being a question of moral duty in a country such as Britain where there is no legal compulsion to vote)? And when they do vote, should each voter see her decision in terms of what will be best for herself, or in terms of what will be best for the society as a whole -or indeed for a still wider community? That is an issue about a political process; but any issue of public moral concern is presumably relevant to the theme of citizenship.
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Health Education; Careers Education and Guidance These remaining two cross-curricular themes from the NCe's list are at first sight different, in that they are less concerned with public moral issues and more with individual choice. For the most part the underlying thinking behind the NCC guidance on these themes seems to be that pupils should be enabled to make their own informed choices. I say 'for the most because there are some matters where it is taken to be the school's responsibility to promote a particular substantive value, beyond, that is, the value to the individual of making her own choices, e.g. from the Health Education guidance, 'The principal objective of family life education is that pupils understand and value the central role of the family as an institution' (p. 4). But for most part the emphasis is on individual choice. This does not mean, however, that such choice is to take place without moral parameters, or the parameters are not debatable. There are, instance, possible choices of lifestyle which predictably will call down moral disapprobation from at least some quarters; and questions the way in which one individual who would make a certain choice for herself is to another who does make that choice, e.g. to take example which could well come up under the sex education aspect of health education, how is person to view the choice of another to go in prostitution? Is that activity to be viewed as legitimate part of a free-market pr,em,nIT' hence a legitimate choice -given suitable precautions? Notice here that what can be as a question of individual choice can also as a question of public morality. And on more generally, is it morally indifferent an individual chooses to earn a living: in one the health care professions; in the production marketing of some rather useless but profitable luxury consumer goods; in manufacture of armaments; as a soldier?
In these examples, which could readily multiplied, we have a considerable variety questions, so far as their subject matter concerned, but they all involve moral questions or if it is reckoned in a particular case that moral issue is raised, that will itself be ueUdllau" I submit that a rational exploration of this context, must involve considering across differences in subject matter. It is plausible, either in the thought of one rlhrirll1al;' or across society, that values come compartments that happen to coincide with categorisations made by the NCC -one set values where health is concerned, another where the environment is concerned, etc. But if rational comparisons are to be made, it seems there must be some common currency in which this can be done -some kind of common vocabulary or conceptual scheme which cuts across differences in subject matter.
Consider the comparison with the rather traditional National Curriculum foundation subjects. To teach a subject to the point where rational discussion can go on within it is, to quite an extent, to teach a language or a set of concepts. Of course, in geography, history, the sciences etc. there is a good deal of information to be assimilated, but the information, if it is to be made use of in a geographical, historical etc. context, will be framed within some recognisable vocabulary which will be to a degree a specialist one. (A point not neglected by the expert committees charged with drawing up syllabuses, even if it has been missed by some politicians.) I want to ask whether there is a common currency for discussion of values.
Readers of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) might well return a negative answer. At the beginning of After Virtue he cites some familiar examples of moral disagreement within our culture -about abortion, the use of nuclear weapons, the justice of redistributive economic policies (notice, by the way, that each of these could well arise in the context of one or other of the cross-curricular themes). MacIntyre says that because conflicting positions on these issues are not ones that fall within a single moral tradition, there is no rational way of resolving them. The disputes arise because different traditions -or fragments of traditions -clash, and there is no common ground to which protagonists of different positions can appeal.
Should we conclude that there is no future for rational discussion of moral issues in schools? I think not, even if MacIntyre is right. MacIntyre claims that our culture has no way of reaching a rational resolution of these disputes -in other words there can be, within our culture, no right answer. But the aim in an educational context does not have to be to arrive at a right answer. In that sense I would certainly not claim that discussion of moral values will ever be like school mathematics. There could be an aim of trying to arrive at a working agreement for practical purposes, but that would be a further development, which I have explored elsewhere (Haydon, G., 1986) simply whether there can be a common language in which moral values can be explored and discussed.
In the case of history, geography, science and the rest, if we can speak of a common language of discourse it is because we can refer to alongstanding well established practice. In the case of issues of values we do have such a long-standing well-established practice, and it would be foolish to ignore what it can offer. The practice, and the language, are those of moral and political philosophy. The picking out of philosophy here, m preference to other academic traditions which do also have things to say about values, is deliberate. One could look instead to theology, but any particular theological tradition will rest on presuppositions which are too substantive to furnish a language in which the range of value positions in multi-faith culture could be compared and debated. Sociology has a lot to say by way of explaining why people in particular groups tend to hold the values they do; but in an educational context an exploration of why people hold their different values, while it might in itself be illuminating, would be only a starting point for an exploration of the values themselves. Psychology has a lot to offer too, but much of the psychology of moral values has taken a developmental line which will be more relevant where development of individual capacities and dispositions is the aim than where the concern is a rational investigation and comparison of competing standpoints. Take Kohlberg's developmental scheme, for instance. If we wish people to be able to have serious debate about their values, the ability to categorise certain positions as being at, say, Stage 3 and others as Stage 4, is at worst invidious and at best irrelevant.
No doubt there is more to be said about the resources offered by alternative academic fields of enquiry, but let me now say something positive in favour of philosophy. MacIntyre is right, of course, that there are very different traditions reflected within moral and political philosophy. But the point is that philosophy itself gives us a language within which to talk about the differences. I would suggest that some of the most well-worn distinctions are still some of the most useful.
Let me look back at my earlier examples. First I mentioned questions about justice, both within a society and between societies. A lot of recent moral philosophy has pretty thoroughly explored various approaches to justice -appeals to utility, to rights, to hypothetical contract. MacIntyre is quite right to point out that the positions of Rawls and Nozick are a kind of formalisation of positions that are found in popular consciousness (After Virtue, ch. 17). What I want to add is that to be able to see current differences over re distributive justice in terms of the Rawls/Nozick debate -to mention just one debate that is relevant -while it certainly doesn't bring one closer to a 'right answer', does take one a long step towards clarifying the differences and seeing them for what they are.
I mentioned then values issues concerning the environment. Fundamental here, I think, is the question whether the only intelligible values are, in the end, human centred. If they are, or even if they are centred more widely on sentient inhabitants of the Earth, then in an environmental context a large step has already been taken towards a utilitarian ethic. If the relevant values are not solely anthropocentric, what basis is there for them? There is scope here for the exploration of theologically based positions of various kinds; and also for the idea that environmental concerns somehow demand a radically new kind of ethic (on which I would suggest that until we have some informed acquaintance with existing varieties of ethical outlook, we are in no position to recognise whether something new is needed).
On citizenship, it will perhaps not need spelling out that once one tries to explore very far a whole range of value issues concerning the relation between the individual, the society and the state, one will soon come to questions about appeals to utility or appeals to rights, and to concerns of a more Aristotelian or communitarian kind -all of them very much already in the arena in our culture, even if not always recognised under this terminology.
I said that both in Health Education and Careers Education the idea of individual choice loomed large. If choice is to be informed, it can be informed not only by factual information but also by understanding of the sorts of value perspective which can be seen to bear on the choice. (Without this understanding, the emphasis on choice can seem to support a radical subjectivism about values which undermines the possibility of serious public debate.) The utilitarian tradition, which has been influential on the legislation of liberal societies, holds that the only reason for condemnation of a practice which an individual might wish to choose is the prevention of harm to others. There is also a strong strand in liberal theory which puts great weight on consent. From 12 the point of view of both these traditions, there may be no moral objection at all to practices which involve only consenting adults and bring about no harm to others -though if there is a danger of harm to the consenting adUlts themselves, the traditions may diverge on the degree of paternalism countenanced. But of course an exploration of values must include the exploration of values which are not rooted in an utilitarian and liberal tradition, and must be able to talk about the moral objections which people do feel to, say, prostitution homosexuality (separately or together). Within philosophical literature there is scope, for instance, for exploring the idea that certain practices are unnatural -what is to count as natural? (a question which also arises from a different perspective within environmental concerns). And what of the idea of respect for persons? Is the Kantian idea that a person must be respected, which involves never treating him or her solely as a means, congruent with the idea that it doesn't matter what you do to a person so long as he or she consents? In the context of career choice, what of the related Kantian idea that one has a duty to develop one's talents? How much restriction does this put on the utilitarianliberal idea that individual preference is paramount? And what again of the idea that the full flourishing of human beings, in their working activity as well as in their leisure, lies in the social nature of human beings, so that doing a job, or a certain sort of job, may in part constitute a person's identity and membership of a community, rather than being simply a means towards independent ends? My suggestion is, then, that the Western tradition of moral and political philosophy contains a rich store of ideas, concepts and arguments which can help to make sense of and bring some order into the 'exploration of values'. But just how, if it is right, can this argument be of help in educational practice? Am I suggesting that all school pupils should be educated in moral and political philosophy?
There is a case that could be made for that, but it would be hard to convince people of it at a time when the National Curriculum itself has put so much pressure on people's time and energy in delivering what has to be delivered. Certainly schools, in considering how to deliver adequately on the cross-curricular themes, could usefully consider the possibility of devoting some time with students, even if only 40 minutes a week in certain years, to a directly focused and deliberately cross-curricular look at values. But
Vol. 17 No. }, 1992 even that modest proposal would need teachers able to handle it in a productive way. And teachers and their own preparation are the focus of concern here. NCC documents constantly refer to the need for cross-curricular planning if the whole curriculum is to be successful. So, we have to envisage that teachers whose own base is in the sciences, history, maths, English, etc. sit down together to see where and how certain ideas are to be got across and considered. Among these concerns will be -or should be -values. It is at this stage, most of all, that a common currency of debate would surely be valuable. What prospect will there be of pupils doing anything more than engaging in an exchange of personal points of view -without further examination and reflection -if teachers themselves do not have the language in which they can recognise the kinds of views that are being brought forward; see where there are links that can be made with issues that might come up in some quite different part of the curriculum; and see where there are lines of approach which are important with the society even though they might happen to be missed within the particular composition of a class? Does this mean a training in moral and political philosophy for all teachers? Again, there could be a strong case for that, but in the present climate is over-ambitious. There is no need to aim at equipping every teacher to consider all the arguments put forward by professional philosophers and to come to his or her own value position on every issue. But there is a more modest aim which should not be impracticable: to introduce teachers to the kind of language and conceptual systems which I have been referring to, to the point where teachers are able to use this language in their own curriculum planning and, where appropriate, in their teaching. This would perhaps best be done, not in distinct courses, but in the process of equipping teachers to handle the ki~d: of value issues which will come up both wIthm the teaching of their own subjects and in their contribution to the teaching of crosscurricular themes. Teachers preparing to teach different subjects can be brought together during their initial training, to work out how these crosssubject areas of the curriculum could be handled. !hi~ n~ed not happen within separate training InstItutIons; there would be a lot to be said for its taking place in schools. But wherever the location, people would be needed with the relevant knowledge and experience who could show student teachers that there is a systematic Way of approaching the value issues which arise, so that they are not left to have to rely on their Own background assumptions or whatever they Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 AlIstralian JOllmal oJTeacher Education may have picked up during their own education. Here, if anywhere, is a matter on which theorists _ even if they are closer to philosophy than to the classroom -have an irreplaceable contribution to make. This is not an element of the education of teachers which existing classroom practitioners can supply, since it has, in almost all cases, been lacking from the education of those practitioners themselves.
In a published lecture, MacIntyre (1987) has asked whether there could in modern conditions be an educated public, and concluded that there could not. Given his definition of an educated public, he was quite right; for him an educated public would have to share -as a result of their education -a single moral-philosophical tradition (utilitarianism, say, or Catholicism) which would set the parameters of their debate on public issues. But in a less demanding and more realistic -though still ambitious -sense, perhaps we need not yet give up on the idea of an educated public as a public sharing a political and civic culture in which value issues would be debated -and they would always remain debatable -in terms of a shared understanding of what the issues are and a shared vocabulary for dealing with them. And teachers would actually be the bearers of this common culture. That seems to me a worthwhile vision. And though there has been little detail about the content of teacher education in this paper, the conclusion is inescapable that if there is any prospect of bringing that vision into contact ~ith present-d~y reality -the reality which mcludes the NatIOnal Curriculum and any likely dev~lopments from it -that prospect will only be realIsed through teacher education.
